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Abstract 
[Excerpt] Also important to any analysis of labor costs in the public sector today is, of course, the effect of 
collective bargaining on wages. For reasons described in a recent article by Orley Ashenfelter, fire fighters 
provide an excellent test of union wage effects at the city level. This study will therefore use fire fighters 
as an example with which to assess and compare the effects on wages of both unionism and the 
structure of municipal government. 
This article is in many respects an extension of the excellent study by Asehenfelter, who examined the 
effect of the International Association of Fire Fighters on wages of firemen over the 1960-66 period and 
concluded that the union did have a statistically significant impact. The present study analyzes the wages 
of firemen in 1969, adds the new variable of government structure, and provides a more accurate 
estimate of the wage effect of unionism through four changes in approach. 
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MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE, 
UNIONIZATION, AND THE 
WAGES OF FIRE FIGHTERS 
RONALD G. EHRENBERG 
A SUBSTANTIAL percentage of all mu-
Anicipalities in the United States 
employ a city manager as the principal 
operating officer rather than an elected 
mayor or set of elected commissioners. 
(See Table 1.) Presumably this reflects 
the belief that a professionally trained 
manager can more efficiently "produce" 
a desired bundle of municipal services.1 
For example, if professionally trained 
managers are better negotiators or are 
more aware of market conditions than 
elected nonprofessionals, one might ex-
pect, ceteris paribus, that city manager-
operated cities will tend to have lower 
wage costs per municipal employee than 
municipalities with other forms of gov-
This study tests the hypothesis that labor 
costs in municipal government arc influenced by 
the structure of "management'-whethcr the 
chief operating officer is a professional manager 
or elected official—as well as by the strength of 
organization among employees. Using fire fight-
ers as a test group, the author constructs a 
model to explain the variation among cities in 
the demand for and supply of firemen and ap-
plies this model to data for 1969 and a sample 
of 270 cities. He concludes that unionism does 
have a significant wage effect in cities that have 
agreed to a formal labor contract, but the struc-
ture of city government appears to have only 
a minor impact on wages. 
Ronald G. Ehrcnbcrg is Associate Professor of 
Economics at the University of Massachusetts. 
He is grateful to Daniel Hamermesh and Albert 
Rees for their comments on earlier versions of 
this article, and to Orlcy Ashenfclter for re-
peated discussions of the subject. His research 
was supported by grants from the Manpower 
Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, and 
the University of Massachusetts.—EDITOR 
eminent.2 To date, however, no study 
has been conducted to ascertain the im-
pact of governmental structure on muni-
cipal employee wages, although the grow-
ing financial crisis of the cities suggests 
that the results of such an analysis could 
be important. 
Also important to any analysis of labor 
costs in the public sector today is, of 
course, the effect of collective bargaining 
on wages. For reasons described in a 
recent article by Orley Ashenfelter,3 fire 
t Political scientists often suggest that the 
widespread adoption of the manager form of 
government is at least partially due to claims 
of its economic efficiency made by proponents 
of the city manager plan. See, for example, C. 
Adrian and C. Press, Governing Urban America, 
3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 206. 
•i A survey of 628 cities with a city manager 
and a population greater than 10,000 found that 
the cities were represented by the manager in 
contract negotiations with employee groups over 
70 percent of the time. See W. Crouch, Employer-
Employee Relations in Council-Manager Cities 
(Washington: International City Managers' Asso-
cation, 1968), p. 60. 
It should be emphasized that low wages for 
fire lighters will be a measure of efficiency only 
if we have standardized for intercity variations 
in the productivity of fire fighters. At points in 
this paper, we have attempted to control for 
these intercity differences in productivity and 
find that this alters none of the conclusions we 
obtain in our unstandardized analysis. The 
proxies we use, however, are crude, and our 
conclusions should be qualified accordingly. 
a Orley Ashenfelter, "The Effect of Unioniza-
tion on Wages in the Public Sector: The Case 
of Fire Fighters," Industrial and Labor Rela-
tions Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 Oanuary l9?1)- PP-
191-202. 
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WAGES OF FIRE FIGHTERS 
munity's taste for fire protection is as-
sumed to be positively related to its 
population density (x2) and the median 
value of housing in the community (x;t). 
Finally, the ability to pay for the service 
is taken to be a positive function of 
median family income (x4). Hence, the 
demand for fire fighters is given by the 
equation, 
(1) D = D(wyxuxiyx3>xA) 
DX < 0 02,01,04,06 > 0. 
Assuming that potential applicants to 
a fire department place different values 
on the relative nonpecuniary benefits of 
fire fighting and alternative forms of 
employment, the supply of labor to a 
fire department is positively related to 
fire fighters' hourly wages (w) and nega-
tively related to the wage (x8) potential 
applicants would expect to obtain from 
alternative employment. Empirically, the 
latter variable is taken to be the average 
hourly earnings of manufacturing pro-
duction workers in the area. Given the 
alternative wage, an increase in the 
community's median education level (x(!) 
will increase the number of qualified 
applicants who apply to the department 
at each fire fighter wage level. Finally, 
only a small proportion of fire fighters 
are nonwhite. Although this is probably 
due primarily to discrimination in hir-
ing, it also may indicate that nonwhites 
derive extremely low nonpecuniary bene-
fits from fire protection employment and 
that, ceteris paribus, the supply of fire 
fighters is negatively related to the non-
white proportion of the population (x7). 
Thus, the supply curve can be written as 
(2) S = S(W,X tftfl) 
Si < 0,&> < 0,^ 3 > 0,£4 < 0. 
In the absence of imperfections in the 
labor market, Equations 1 and 2 can be 
solved to determine a single market 
clearing wage (to0).1 
(3 ) Wc = WC(X1,X2,X3,X4,X6,X«,X7) 
M>lC,W2C,W3e,">4C,W&C>W7C > 0lVtC < 0 . 
Empirically, this reduced form equa-
tion can be approximated by the follow-
ing specific functional form. 
(4) uf 
Suppose that the IAFF succeeds in 
pushing up fire fighters' wages by the 
same percentage above the market clear-
ing wage (y0) in all unionized cities in 
our sample, and it has no impact on fire 
fighters' wages in nonunion cities.8 If u 
"> Even if the labor market for fire fighters in 
a city is characterized by a monopsony structure 
rather than a competitive structure, the equilib-
rium wage (w»>) will still be a function of the 
same variables as tu<\ The impacts on wages 
of those variables that influence the demand 
curve will be qualitatively identical to their im-
pacts in Equation 3; however, the impacts of 
the supply-side variables may be qualitatively 
different. See J. Robinson, Economics of Im-
perfect Competition (London: MacMillan, 1938) 
for the earliest exposition of this point. 
s I am ignoring the spillover effects of the 
IAFF on the wages of fire fighters in nonunion 
cities in my theoretical structure. For a treat-
ment of this problem, see S. Rosen, "Trade 
Union Power, Threat Effects, and the Extent 
of Organization," Review of Economic Studies, 
Vol. 3(i, No. 2 (April 1969), pp. 185-196. Em-
pirically, only the wage advantage of IAFF 
members relative to nonunion fire fighters can 
be estimated, and no statement as to the IAFF's 
impact on absolute wages should be inferred. 
The assumption that «0 is constant across 
cities (in the absence of different forms of gov-
ernment) is also patently false. However, as 
shown by Ashenfclter, "The Effect of Unioniza-
tion on Wages in the Public Sector: The Case 
of Fire Fighters," pp. 194-197, and originally 
H. G. Lewis, Unionism and Relative Wages in the 
United States (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1964), pp. 27-40, all that can be estimated 
empirically is the value of the proportionate 
union-nonunion average wage differential across 
cities. For expositional purposes, I have assumed 
this differential to be constant across cities. 
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INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 
is a zero-one dummy variable, which 
takes on the value unity when the fire 
fighters in a city are unionized, then the 
observed wage (w) is given by 
(5) 
or 
w = wc(\ + 70«) 
log w ~ log wc -f 7„«' 
The structure of municipal govern-
ment may affect the wages of fire fighters 
in two ways. First, city managers may be 
more efficient negotiators than either 
elected nonprofessional mayors or com-
missioners. This may be due either to 
their professional training or the differ-
ent type of political pressures that they 
face. As a result they may reduce the 
ability of the IAFF to push up the 
wages of its members. Second, city man-
agers may be more efficient than mayors 
or commissioners in "producing" fire 
protection services from a given number 
of firemen. Hence, they may reduce the 
derived demand for fire protection em-
ployees and the market clearing wage 
(wc). Finally, since an elected commis-
sioner has more limited responsibility 
and can focus his attention on a nar-
rower range of issues than a mayor, 
ceteris paribus, we might also expect that 
commission-run cities will have lower 
wages than cities in which an elected 
mayor is the chief operating officer. 
To test these hypotheses, let gt be a 
dichotomous variable that takes on the 
value of one if the municipality has a 
city manager form of government and 
zero if it does not. Let g2 be a similar 
variable with a value of one representing 
the commission form of government and 
a value of zero indicating another form. 
Suppose that, 
(6) To = <4 + rfigi + digi, 
of0 = «o + «i£i + atg* 
Substituting Equations f> and 4 into 
Equation 5 then yields our basic estimat-
ing equation, 
(7) log w = «„ -f- «,,?, -|- dig* 
7 
•f 2J «;• log ,\v-h r/„K 
7=1 
+ digiu + d2g2u. 
Statistically significant estimates of A, 
or A2 (dx or d.,) will indicate that on 
average city managers or commissioners 
do differ from mayors in their ability to 
produce fire protection services and to 
negotiate with the IAFF." 
9 Again, it is important to emphasize that, as 
in the case of the union impact, empirically all 
that can be estimated are the average measures 
of the impact of government structure, although 
the effectiveness of individual executives obvi-
ously varies widely across cities within any one 
of the governmental categories. Furthermore, the 
data do not permit one to distinguish between 
"strong-mayor" and "weak-mayor" forms of gov-
ernment. 
It should also be noted that there are several 
studies by political scientists that attempt to 
ascertain the "determinants" of the structure of 
municipal government. Examples of this litera-
ture include J. Kesscl, "Governmental Structure 
and Political Environment: A Statistical Note 
About American Cities," American Political Sci-
ence Review, Vol. 56, No. 3 (September 1962), 
pp. 615-620; R. Wolfinger and J. Field, "Polit-
ical Ethos and the Structure of City Govern-
ment," American Political Science Review, Vol. 
60, No. 2 (June 1966), pp. 303-326; and R. 
Lineberry and E. Fowler, "Reformism and Pub-
lic Policies in American Cities," American Po-
litical Science Review, Vol. 61, No. 3 (Septem-
ber 1967), pp. 701-717. Much of the literature 
is summarized in B. Hawkins, Politics and 
Urban Policies (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1971). 
Primarily using simple pairwise comparisons 
of the mean values of variables across types of 
cities, these studies have found that the struc-
ture of municipal government appears to be 
correlated with various socioeconomic and demo-
graphic variables. The specific variables consid-
ered and the signs of the relationships found 
have varied with the sample of cities studied. 
The form of a local government, however, has 
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WAGES OF FIRE FIGHTERS 41 
The dependent variable in Equation 
7 is a measure of the hourly wage rate of 
fire fighters. The IAFF or municipal 
government decision makers influence 
this rate through altering either the an-
nual salary of fire fighters (S) or their 
annual hours of work (//). Indeed, it is 
an identity that 
(8) log w = log S - log// . 
As a result, variants of Equation 7 that 
utilize log S and log H are also used as 
dependent variables. Due to the condi-
tion presented in Equation 8, the theo-
retical impact of any independent vari-
able on log w will equal its impact on 
log S minus its impact on log H, and the 
least-squares estimates of the variants of 
Equation 7 preserve this property. Con-
sequently, one can empirically analyze 
the impact of the IAFF (or the munici-
pal government structure) on the hourly 
wage of fire fighters as the difference be-
tween its impacts on annual earnings and 
annual hours of work. 
Empirical Results 
Estimates of Equation 7 will now be 
presented, utilizing cross-sectional data 
for a sample of 270 cities that had popu-
lations of between 25,000 and 250,000 in 
1969.10 Three different hourly (annual) 
usually been found .to be "related" to variables 
reflecting the city's ethnic composition, size, in-
come distribution, economic base, population 
growth, religious composition, regional location, 
etc. To the extent that municipal government 
structure is endogenously determined, the pa-
rameter estimates obtained in the present study 
may reflect, to some degree, the impact of 
omitted variables, rather than an exogenous 
stiuoture of government. Our conclusions should 
be further qualified due to this point. 
io Cities with populations of less than 25,000 
were excluded from the sample due to the un-
availability of data for several of the independ-
ent variables; cities with populations greater 
than 250,000 were excluded since virtually all 
wage measures were used in the analysis: 
the entrance hourly (annual) wage for 
uniformed fire fighters W^SJ, the maxi-
mum nonpromotional hourly (annual) 
wage of uniformed fire fighters W2(S2), 
and the average hourly (annual) wage 
for all fire department employees W,(S3). 
Each of these variables was deflated by 
an estimate of the city cost-of-living in-
dex to control for intercity cost-of-living 
differentials. This practice was applied 
to all other variables that were expressed 
in money terms.11 
As noted earlier, two unionization 
variables were used. The first, u„ was a 
dichotomous variable that took on the 
value one if an IAFF local were present 
in the city and zero otherwise. The 
second variable, «.„., took on the value of 
one if the city had a contract with an 
IAFF local and zero otherwise. In addi-
tion, to account for the interdependence 
that exists between the salaries of police 
and firemen, a variable representing the 
proportion of police patrolmen who 
belong to a national union (p), was in-
have IAFF locals (sec Table 2). Data for 1969 
were used because of the availability of infor-
mation identifying those cities that had a con-
tract with an IAFF local that year. Somewhat 
fortuitously, this was also the first year after 
the IAFF eliminated the "no-strike" clause from 
its constitution. 
ii Comparative cost-of-living indices for forty 
metropolitan areas and nonmetropolitan areas 
(by region) are available from the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, Handbook of Labor Statistics, 
Bulletin 1666 (Washington: G.P.O., 1970). For 
these areas I estimated a cost-of-living index 
equation using as independent variables six size-
class-of-SMSA dummy variables and four region-
of-country dummy variables. Estimates for the 
unavailable comparative cost-of-living indices for 
the other cities in the sample were then con-
structed using this equation. Details of this pro-
cedure, which differs from that used by Ashen-
felter, arc available from the author. Estimates 
of Equation 7, using undeflated money variables, 
did not differ significantly from those presented 
in the text. 
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eluded as an independent variable in 
Equation 7.12 
Table 3 presents estimates of the 
variants of Equation 7, which include M, 
as an independent variable; similar esti-
mates for the specifications utilizing u2 
are found in Table 4. In no case did the 
municipal government structure have 
significant impact on the ability of the 
IAFF to improve the wages of their 
members. Consequently, only the esti-
mates that constrain r/, and d., to be 
zero are presented in these tables. In 
addition, the variables available as 
proxies for the average productivity of 
fire fighters in the city were initially 
omitted from the regressions.18 
In both tables virtually all of the 
coefficients of the variables representing 
supply and demand conditions have the 
anticipated signs for the hourly wage 
and annual salary coefficients. Several of 
these coefficients are not statistically sig-
nificant; however, this may be due par-
tially to problems of severe multicolli-
nearity. 
Somewhat surprisingly, annual salaries 
is There were not adequate data to consider 
two points: (1) whether the police union had 
a contract with the city and (2) the implica-
tions of the fact that police patrolmen's local 
unions are affiliated with more than one na-
tional union (primarily the Patrolmen's Benevo-
lent Association and the American Federation of 
State, County, and Municipal employees). 
is This was done because of the crude nature 
of the available proxies: the number of hours 
oV fire ground operational training given re-
cruits and a dummy variable that took on the 
value of one if the completion of an outside 
educational course were a requirement for a 
salary increase, and zero if it were not. The 
average productivity of fire fighters may also be 
endogenously determined; for a discussion of 
this point see Ronald Ehrenberg, "Heterogene-
ous Labor, Minimum Hiring Standards and Job 
Vacancies in Public Employment," Journal of 
Political Economy (forthcoming). Except for a 
North-South division, Ashcnfelter did not at-
tempt to control for quality differentials be-
tween cities either. 
are between 5 and 8 percent higher in 
manager-run cities than mayor-council 
cities, when other factors are equal. The 
size of the differential varies with the 
dependent variable and model specifica-
tion used (Columns 1-3 of these tables). 
The higher annual salaries, however, 
are due solely to the fact that fire fight-
ers work 9 percent more in manager-run 
cities (Column 4). As a result, hourly 
earnings are betwen 1 and 4 percent 
lower in manager cities than mayor-
council cities (Columns 5-7). In addi-
tion, hourly earnings are between 5 and 
8 percent lower in commission cities 
than in mayor-council cities (Columns 
5-7). In neither case, however, are these 
hourly earnings differences statistically 
significant. 
The coefficients indicate that the im-
pact of the IAFF on annual salaries, 
hourly wages, and hours of work is not 
statistically significant when M, is used 
as a measure of unionization (the impact 
on annual salaries in this case is, in fact, 
negative).14 When Ashenfelter used «„ 
however, he found the wage effect of the 
IAFF to be statistically significant in 
several cases, especially in his 1966 data. 
Our differences in results may partially 
reflect the different years utilized, our 
slightly different samples of cities, and 
differences in constructing the price 
index. More important, Ashenfelter's 
model may have been mispecified, for 
it included only the extent of unioniza-
tion and the logarithm of an estimate 
of the city price level and therefore 
omitted variables representing supply 
H These negative coefficients may indicate a 
simultaneity problem, if those cities with ini-
tially low fire fighters' wages were the first to 
unionize. If this hypothesis is correct, then the 
coefficients in Table 4 understate the true im-
pact of the IAFF on wages. 
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WAGES OF FIRE FIGHTERS 43 
Table 3, Coefficients for Fire Fighters' Compensation and Hours, for 1969; 
Union Variable—Cities in Which There was an IAFF Local. 
(absolute / statistics, N = 270) 
Independent 
Variable 
Sx 
(/) 
A 
(2) 
s* (3) 
Dependent Variable 
H 
(4) 
Wx 
(5) 
Wt 
(6) 
Wi 
(7) 
«1 
p 
Si 
Si 
Xt 
Xt 
Xi 
Xt 
Xt 
Xl 
R* 
-.006 
(0.3) 
-.001 
(2.2)* 
.049 
(2.6)* 
-.025 
(0.7) 
.062 
(4.7)* 
.016 
(0.3) 
.431 
(5.0)* 
.134 
(3.8)* 
-.098 
(0.9) 
.001 
(1.3) 
.435 
-.024 
0.3) 
-.001 
(2.7)* 
.068 
(3.9)* 
-.011 
(0.3) 
.052 
(4.1)* 
.054 
(1.1) 
.382 
(4.6)* 
.105 
(3.2)* 
.086 
(0.8) 
.001 
(1.5) 
.509 
-.008 
(0.3) 
-.001 
(2.7)* 
.065 
(2.5)* 
-.004 
(0.1) 
.072 
(3.9)* 
.025 
(0.3) 
.390 
(3.2)* 
.148 
(3.0)* 
.109 
(0.7) 
.001 
(0.6) 
.355 
-.032 
(1.8)** 
-.001 
(0.5) 
.088 
(5.1)* 
.058 
(1.8)** 
-.045 
(3.7)* 
-.043 
(0.9) 
-.075 
(0.9) 
-.001 
(0.1) 
.228 
(2.3)* 
.001 
0 .5) 
.241 
.026 
(1.0) 
-.001 
(2.9)* 
-.039 
(1.6) 
-.083 
(1.8)** 
.107 
(6.0)* 
.059 
(0.1) 
.506 
(4.3)* 
.135 
(2.8)* 
-.326 
(2.2)* 
-.001 
(0.1) 
.378 
.008 
(1.3) 
-.001 
(1.5) 
-.020 
(0.8) 
-.068 
(1.5) 
.097 
(5.5)* 
.097 
(1.4) 
.457 
(4.0)* 
.106 
(2.3)* 
-.142 
(1.0) 
.001 
(0.1) 
.408 
.024 
(0.7) 
-.001 
(2.0)* 
-.023 
(0.8) 
-.062 
(1.1) 
.117 
(5.3)* 
.068 
(0.9) 
.466 
(3.3)* 
.149 
(2.6)* 
-.119 
(0.7) 
.001 
(0.3) 
.323 
•Significant at the .05 level, two-tailed test. 
••Significant at the .10 level, two-tailed test. 
wi =• one if there were an IAFF local in the city in 1969 and zero otherwise. 
«8 = one if there were an IAFF local with a contract with the city in 1969 and zero otherwise. 
gi = one if the city had a city manager form of government in 1969 and zero otherwise. 
gj = one if the city had a commission form of government in 1969 and zero otherwise. 
p *• proportion of city's police patrolmen who belonged to a national union in 1969. 
xt = population density in 1960. 
xt = median value of housing in 1960. 
xt = median family income in 1960. 
Xt = Average hourly earnings of manufacturing production workers in 1963; 
xt «• median education level in 1960. 
JC7 = nonwhite proportion of the population in 1960. 
S\ => the entrance annual salary for uniformed fire fighters. 
St => the maximum nonpromotional annual salary for uniformed fire fighters. 
St «* the average annual salary for all fire department employees. 
H = fire fighters' annual hours of work. 
W\ - the entrance hourly wage for uniformed fire fighters. 
W% => the maximum nonpromotional hourly wage for uniformed fire fighters. 
Wi = the average hourly wage for all fire department employees. 
Source: "Governmental Data for Cities Over 5,000 Population," Municipal Tear Book—1966 (Washing-
ton: International City Managers Association, 1966), pp. 98-159 (g\,gt). 
Boyd Hartley, "Fire Department Unionization," Municipal Tear Book—1970 (Washington: International 
City Managers Association, 1970), pp. 391-437 (m, «j). 
"Police Department Statistics," Municipal Tear Book—1969 (Washington: International City Managers 
Association, 1969), pp. 335-369 (/>). 
"Fire and Police Salary Expenditures," Municipal Tear Book—1969 (Washington: International City 
Managers Association, 1969), pp. 146-181 (Wit Wi, Wit Si, St, Si, H). 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Databook—1967(Washington: G.P.O., 1967) (xh *j , *«, xit xit x7). 
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Table 4. Coefficients for Fire Fighters' Compensation and Hours, for 1969; 
Union Variable-Cities in Which There was an IAFF Local with a 
Contract with the City, t 
(absolute t statistics, N = 270) 
Independent 
Variable 
Si 
(/) (2) 
Dependent Variable 
Si H Wi Wi 
(3) (4) (5) (<*) (7) 
HI 
P 
a 
Si 
Xi 
Xi 
Xi 
Xi 
xt 
Xi 
.032 
(1.7)** 
-.001 
(2.6)* 
.053 
(2.8)* 
-.020 
(0.6) 
.062 
(4.7)* 
.017 
(0.3) 
.440 
(5.1)* 
.130 
(3.7)* 
-.064 
(0.6) 
.002 
(1.7)* 
.441 
.027 
(1 .6) 
- . 001 
(3.D* 
.074 
(4.2)* 
-.006 
(0.2) 
.052 
(4.2)* 
.060 
(1.2) 
.396 
(4.8)* 
.099 
(3.0)* 
.109 
(1.0) 
.002 
(1.9)** 
.510 
.051 
(2.0)* 
-.001 
(3.0)* 
.071 
(2.8)* 
.003 
(0.1) 
.071 
(3.9)* 
.026 
(0.4) 
.404 
(3.4)* 
.141 
(2.9)* 
.162 
(1.0) 
.001 
(l.D 
.364 
-.047 
(2.8)* 
-.001 
(0.5) 
.088 
(5.1)* 
.051 
(1.6) 
-.043 
(3.6)* 
-.034 
(0.7) 
-.074 
(0.9) 
.003 
(0.7) 
.168 
(1.6) 
.001 
(0.7) 
.254 
.082 
(3.2)* 
-.001 
(1.5) 
-.035 
(1.4) 
-.071 
(1.6) 
.106 
(5.9)* 
.050 
(0.7) 
.514 
(4.5)* 
.127 
(2.7)* 
-.232 
(1.5) 
.001 
(0.7) 
.400 
.075 
(3.0)* 
-.001 
(1.9)** 
-.013 
(0.5) 
-.057 
(1.2) 
.106 
(5.5)* 
.093 
(1.4) 
.471 
(4.2)* 
.096 
(2.D* 
-.058 
(0.4) 
.001 
(0.8) 
.408 
.098 
(3.2)* 
-.001 
(2.2)* 
-.016 
(0.5) 
-.048 
(0.9) 
.115 
(5.4)* 
.059 
(0.7) 
.478 
(3.4)* 
.138 
(2.4)* 
-.061 
(0.3) 
.001 
(0.5) 
.349 
tData sources and variable definitions are the same as in Table 3. 
•Significant at the .05 level, two-tailed test. 
••Significant at the .10 level, two-tailed test. 
and demand conditions. If these vari-
ables are correlated with the extent of 
fire fighters' unionization, his estimated 
union coefficients may have been biased 
estimates of the true parameters. 
To test for this possibility, I reesti-
mated his model for my sample of cities 
in 1969 and found that the price term 
always had a coefficient greater than 2.0. 
The implication that a 1 percent in-
crease in the price level will lead to a 
greater than 2 percent increase in an-
nual (or hourly) wages strongly suggests 
the omission of an important variable, 
or set of variables, from his model. 
Further evidence supporting this view 
is presented in the Kasper study. Rasper 
found that whereas the simple correla-
tion between teachers' salaries and 
unionization was .558 in his sample, the 
partial correlation fell to .068 after per 
capita income, urbanization, and several 
other variables were included in his 
estimating equation.15 
In contrast, when the variable w2 is 
used in our model (Table 4), the results 
differ markedly. Fire fighters worked 5 
percent fewer annual hours in 1969 in 
cities where the union had a contract 
than in cities without an IAFF contract. 
Furthermore, annual minimum and 
maximum salaries were about 3 percent 
higher in cities with contracts, and 
actual average annual compensation was 
is Kasper, "The Effect of Collective Bargain-
ing on Public School Teachers' Salaries," p . 63. 
Copyright (c) 2000 Bell & Howell Information and Learn ing Company 
Copyright (c) Cornell University 
Ehrenberg, Ronald G., Municipal Government Structure, Unionization, and the Wages of Fire 
Fighters , Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 27:1 (1973:Oct.) p.36 
WAGES OF FIRE FIGHTERS 45 
about 5 percent higher. Consequently, 
firemen's hourly wages in those cities 
were between 7 and 10 percent higher 
in 1969 than in other cities, with the 
largest differential in the average hourly 
wage. These results strongly suggest that 
a contract with the city is necessary if 
the union is to have a significant impact 
on wages.16 
The effect of the police union variable 
on fire fighters' hourly wages and annual 
salaries is negative and often significant. 
The magnitude of the effect, however, 
is virtually zero. The negative coeffi-
cients may reflect the fact that in many 
cities police unions have sought to elimi-
nate the traditional parity relationship 
between police and fire fighter wage 
scales. To the extent that they are suc-
cessful, one would expect fire fighters' 
relative wages to fall, given the existence 
io Ashenfelter has suggested to me that rather 
than estimating the specifications reported in 
Tables 3 and 4, one should simultaneously esti-
mate these proportionate wage differentials: non-
union—union without contract, and union with-
out contract—union with contract. That is, if 
one ignores the impact of the municipal gov-
ernment structure variables on the union effects, 
Equation 7 can be rewritten 
(7a) log w = ait + a\g\ + atgi 
-f ) . ay log Xj + <i«i + emut 
The nonunion—union with contract propor-
tionate wage differential (ei + ei) can be de-
composed into a nonunion—union without con-
tract differential (ei) and a union without con-
tract—union with contract differential (e^). My 
estimation of Equation 7a indicated that almost 
uniformly e\ was not statistically significant— 
that a contract with the city is necessary if the 
union is 'to have a significant impact on wages. 
Consequently, the nonunion—union with con-
tract differentials reported in Tables 4 and 5 are 
approximately equal to the union without con-
tract—union with contract differentials ^2) • t 
am indebted to Ashenfelter for suggesting this 
point to mc. 
of excess supplies of applicants to fire 
departments.17 
The Effect of City Size 
It seems plausible that the impact of 
the IAFF on the wages of fire fighters 
will vary inversely with city size, since 
municipal executives of larger cities can 
afford to hire professionally trained 
labor negotiators to help them.18 Simi-
larly, one would expect the impact of 
municipal government structure on fire 
fighters' wages to vary with city size. 
Mayors or commissioners of larger cities 
can afford to hire professionally trained 
administrative assistants; hence, the rela-
tive efficiency of the city manager form 
of government and its ability to hold 
down fire fighters' wages should be 
greatest for the small-size classes of cities. 
To test these hypotheses, the variants 
of Equation 7, with dr and d2 constrained 
to be equal to zero, were reestimated 
with the data segmented into two 
groups: one restricted to cities with 
populations of 25,000-50,000 and the 
other to cities in the 50,000-250,000 
» Evidence that police unions have supported 
movements away from parity is cited by E. 
Devine, "Manpower Shortages in Local Govern-
ment Employment," American Economic Re-
view, Vol. 59, No. 2 (May 1969), pp. 538-545. 
Excess supplies of applicants are often rationed 
by increasing minimum hiring standards; how-
ever, these standards may be endogenously de-
termined as functions of fire fighters' wages. See 
Ehrenberg, "Heterogeneous Labor, Minimum 
Hiring Standards and Job Vacanies in Public 
Employment." 
i« An alternative explanation suggested by a 
referee is that smaller cities may have a greater 
degree of monopsony power in dealing with 
public employees. The bilateral monopoly situa-
tion that emerges when workers are unionized 
may then produce larger wage gains in this 
situation than in the more highly competitive 
large urban market. It does not appear that the 
data can differentiate between these competing 
explanations. 
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city manager cities than mayor-council 
cities (at most, 6 percent lower), the 
advantage of the manager form of gov-
ernment is smaller for the small class of 
cities. Uniformly, fire fighters appear to 
work more annual hours and receive 
lower hourly wages in commission cities 
than in mayor-council cities. (See Table 
5, the last two rows.) These coefficients 
do not appear to vary with city size and 
are not, for the most part, statistically 
significant. 
Finally, variants of Equation 7 were 
reestimated, including as explanatory 
variables two proxy variables for the 
average productivity of fire fighters (xx) 
—the number of hours of fire ground 
operational training given recruits and 
a dummy variable that assumed the 
value one if the completion of an out-
side educational course was a require-
ment for a salary increase, and zero 
otherwise.20 These imperfect proxies 
were excluded from the earlier regres-
sions for reasons cited previously.21 They 
were utilized at this point to check if 
their omission biased the coefficients of 
the union and city structure variables. 
These results need only to be sum-
marized. In all cases, the "quality" vari-
ables were significantly and positively 
related to the fire fighters' annual salary 
and hourly wage variables, as expected. 
The coefficients of the union (M2) and 
government structure variables, when 
these variables were included, were, for 
the most part, quite similar to those re-
ported previously. For cities in the 
zoThese variables were derived from data con-
tained in the Boyd Hartley, "Fire Department 
Training," Municipal Year Book—1972 (Wash-
ington: International City Managers Association, 
1972), pp. 145-155. A variable representing the 
number of hours of classroom training given 
recruits was virtually perfectly correlated with 
the former variable and was omitted from the 
analysis. 
si See footnote 13. 
25,000-50,000 population class, however, 
the impact of the IAFF on hourly wages 
rose to between 14 and 18 percent. 
Furthermore, several of the coefficients 
of the commission dummy variables be-
came statistically significant. 
Conclusions 
This study has presented estimates of 
the impact of both the IAFF and muni-
cipal government structure on the sala-
ries, wages, and hours of work of fire 
fighters in 1969. When the measure of 
unionization previously considered by 
Ashenfelter is used, the IAFF is found 
to have had, on average, virtually no 
effect on hours or earnings. When a 
measure is utilized that considers 
whether the IAFF has a contract with 
the city, however, the results are mark-
edly different. 
In cities with union contracts, hourly 
wages of fire fighters are, on average, 
from 2 to 18 percent higher. These in-
creases are divided into a decrease of 
annual hours of between 2 and 9 percent 
and an increase in annual earnings from 
0 to 9 percent. The average impact of 
the IAFF on hourly wages appears to be 
greater in small cities than in large. 
Furthermore, the impact on average an-
nual (hourly) earnings of fire depart-
ment employees (the variable used by 
Ashenfelter) is greater than the impacts 
on minimum and maximum annual 
(hourly) salaries of fire fighters. Since the 
union presumably bargains for salary 
scales rather than realized average 
values, this suggests that less faith should 
be placed in the accuracy of the mea-
sured union impact on the average earn-
ings variables and that a positive cor-
relation probably exists between the 
unionization variable and the seniority 
structure of fire departments' work 
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forces. In any case, like Ashenfelter, I 
found that the IAFF has had only a 
moderate impact on the annual earnings 
of fire fighters. 
City manager cities appear, on aver-
age, to have annual fire fighters' salaries 
that are from 1 to 10 percent higher 
than salaries in mayor-council cities; 
however, annual hours of work, ceteris 
paribus, appear to be from 3 to 11 per-
cent higher in manager cities. As a re-
sult, hourly wages of fire fighters in city 
manager cities are marginally lower 
than those in mayor-council cities. For 
cities of between 50,000 and 250,000 in 
population, this differential appears to 
be from 3 to 6 percent. These percent-
ages, however, are not statistically sig-
nificant. 
Finally, fire fighters in cities with 
elected commissioners tend to work, on 
average, from 4 to 8 percent more hours 
and have hourly earnings from 2 to 15 
percent lower than fire fighters in mayor-
council cities. Although many of the 
relevant coefficient estimates are statistic-
ally insignificant again, it does appear 
that the commission form of government 
has had some limited success in holding 
down the cost of fire protection employ-
ees. 
These results, unfortunately, do not 
support any unambiguous conclusion 
concerning the form of municipal gov-
ernment that is best suited to meet the 
growing financial crisis of the cities. Sub-
ject to the qualifications noted earlier 
in this article,22 it does appear that 
22 See footnotes 2 and 9. 
hourly wages of fire fighters are margin-
ally lower in city manager and commis-
sion cities than in mayor-council cities. 
The differentials, however, are often not 
statistically significant and are primarily 
due to the greater number of hours 
worked by firemen in these cities. Over 
time, one would expect these hours 
differentials to be eroded by competitive 
pressures generated by nearby cities. 
Furthermore, fire fighters are unique 
among municipal employees in that 
their "work week" is substantially longer 
and subject to more variability across 
cities than other groups. Since hours of 
work vary substantially less for other 
categories of municipal employees, it is 
unlikely that the results of this study 
can be generalized to them. Conse-
quently, a more comprehensive study of 
the determinants of the wages of various 
categories of municipal employees is 
required before definitive statements can 
be made about the most "efficient" struc-
ture of municipal government. 
It should be emphasized, in conclud-
ing, that in no case did the structure of 
municipal government appear to have a 
significant impact on the ability of the 
IAFF to improve the wages of their 
members. As a result, for fire fighters, the 
impacts of the governmental structure 
and unionization variables seem to be 
independent of each other. Further-
more, it also appears that relative wage 
differentials associated with unionization 
are larger than those associated with 
the structure of local government. 
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